Local differential privacy has been proposed as a strong measure of privacy under data collection scenarios, where individuals are willing to share their data but are concerned about revealing sensitive information. Both data providers and data collectors want to maximize the benefit of statistical inference performed on the data but at the same time need to protect the privacy of the participating individuals. We address a general problem of utility maximization under local differential privacy. Our main result is a characterization of the combinatorial structure of the optimal solution resulting in a family of extremal mechanisms we call staircase mechanisms. These data dependent mechanisms add to the few basic privatization schemes known in the literature (eg: the exponential mechanism and noise-adding mechanisms). Finally, we show that two simple staircase mechanisms (the binary and randomized response mechanisms) are optimal in the high and low privacy regimes, respectively. Our results also characterize lower bounds in differential privacy, providing some new lower bounds as well as recovering some known results. As a motivating example, we provide optimal mechanisms and show that the effective sample size reduces from n to ε 2 n under differential privacy in the context of hypothesis testing.
Introduction
In statistical analyses involving data from individuals, there is an increasing tension between the need to share the data and the need to protect sensitive information about the individuals. For example, users of social networking sites are increasingly cautious about privacy, but still find it inevitable to agree to share personal information in order to benefit from customized services such as recommendations and personalized search [1, 2] . There is a certain utility in sharing data for both data providers and data analysts, but at the same time the individuals want plausible deniability when it comes to sensitive information.
For such systems, there is a natural core optimization problem to be solved. Assuming both the data providers and the data collector want to maximize the utility of the released data, how can they do so while preserving the privacy of the individuals? The formulation and study of a general framework addressing this tradeoff is the focus of this paper.
Local differential privacy. The need for data privacy appears in two different contexts: one in the data collection scenario, as in when individuals disclose their personal information (e.g. voluntarily on social network sites). The second context is in the data release scenario, as in when institutions release databases of information of several people or answer queries on such databases (e.g. US Government releases census data, companies like Netflix release proprietary data for others to test state of the art data analytics). The first context is typically called "local privacy" and the second one "global privacy". We study local privacy, which dates back to Warner [27] who proposed a randomized response model in order to ensure plausible deniability of the participants responding to sensitive issues.
It is typically assumed that privacy is protected when inference of information beyond what is released is hard. In the local privacy context, the inference could be in terms of the personal information itself. In the global privacy context, the inference could be the identity/presence of a specific individual in a database query. Specifically, requiring the hardness of the inference among every pair of possible hypotheses would be a strong notion of privacy. Differential privacy has been proposed in the global privacy context to formally capture such a strong notion of privacy [11, 13, 12] . In a nutshell, (global) differential privacy ensures that an adversary should not be able to reliably infer whether a particular individual is participating in a database query or not, even with access to every entry in the database except for that particular individual's data and an unbounded computational power.
Recently, this notion of differential privacy has been extended to local privacy [10] . Concretely, we consider a scenario where each of the n data providers has her data X i ∈ X and X 1 , . . . , X n are independently sampled from some distribution P ν parameterized by ν ∈ {0, 1}. The data collector wants to test her hypothesis on ν, based on the privatized views Y 1 , . . . , Y n ∈ Y of the original data. The original data {X i } n i=1 and the privatized output {Y i } n i=1 are related via a set of conditional distributions Q(Y i |X i = x, Y j = y j , ∀j = i). We consider Q's satisfying the privacy conditions, and we refer to Q as a privatization mechanism. For a positive ε ≥ 0, we follow the definition of [10] and say a mechanism Q is ε-locally differentially private if sup S,x,x ,{y j } j =i
where the supremum is taken over S ∈ σ(Y), y j ∈ Y and x, x ∈ X where σ(Y) denotes an appropriate σ-field on Y. Note that Y i is not constrained to be a single release of data based on X i , and multiple releases can be accounted for using a larger alphabet Y. Further, the statistical dependence of Y i on {Y j } j =i captures possible interactive queries, where a query might depend on other released data. Information theoretic utilities for statistical analysis. A data analyst is interested in the statistics of the data as opposed to individual samples. Naturally, the utility should also be measured in terms of the distribution rather than sample quantities. Concretely, we consider data X 1 , . . . , X n independently generated from the identical distribution P ν parameterized by ν and let the induced marginal distribution of Y 1 , . . . , Y n be
for S ∈ σ(Y n ) where Q n is the conditional distribution of Y 1 , . . . , Y n conditioned on the original data according to a particular privatization mechanism Q. In this paper, we are interested in a client-server setting, where each client with data X i sends a privatized version of the data Y i , via a privatization mechanism Q(y|x). Given n independent and privatized Y i 's at the server, a data analyst wants to make inference based on the induced marginal distribution
for S ∈ σ(Y). We study the problem of maximizing utility of the privatized data measured via information theoretic quantities on the induced marginal M ν . Suppose there are two hypothesis, ν = 0 and ν = 1, on a pair of distributions P 0 and P 1 . A data analyst wants to test whether the data is generated from P 0 or P 1 based on privatized views Y 1 , . . . , Y n . According to ChernoffStein's lemma, for a bounded type I error probability, the best type II error probability scales as e −n D kl (M 0 ||M 1 ) . Naturally, we are interested in finding a privatization mechanism Q that minimizes the error, by solving the following problem:
where D ε is the set of all ε-locally differentially private mechanisms satisfying (1) . Motivated by such applications in statistical inference, our goal is to provide a general framework for finding optimal privatization mechanisms that maximize f -divergences of the induced marginals under local differential privacy. Throughout this paper, we assume the client-server setting, where each client only talks to the server. However, the techniques developed in this paper are more general: in a different application, one might be interested in a multi-party setting where each party is allowed to talk to the other parties. The powerful techniques developed in this work can be generalized to find optimal mechanisms in a multi-party setting as well, but this is outside the scope of this paper.
Contributions. We uncover the combinatorial structure of optimal solutions to a large class of optimization problems under local (and global) differential privacy constraints, resulting in a family of optimal mechanisms. This contributes an important progress in the differential privacy area, where the basic mechanisms have been few and almost no exact optimality results are known. We further provide a linear program, with a number of variables exponential in the alphabet |X |, to explicitly find the optimal mechanisms for an instance of the problem. Since this is computationally challenging, we propose simple mechanisms (the binary mechanism and the randomized response) which are optimal in the high and low privacy regimes, respectively. Our results further characterize lower bounds in differential privacy, providing some new lower bounds as well as recovering some known results. As a motivating example, we provide optimal mechanisms and show that the effective sample size reduces from n to ε 2 n under differential privacy in the context of hypothesis testing.
Related work. Our work is closely related to the recent work of [10] where a bound on KLdivergence was derived under the same local differential privacy setting. Precisely, Duchi et. al. address the problem of finding a converse to the optimization problem of (4), and show that the KL-divergence is at most 4(e ε − 1) 2 P 1 − P 2 2 T V . This bound is further used to provide a minimax bound on statistical estimation using information theoretic converse techniques such as Fano's and Le Cam's inequalities.
In a similar spirit, we are also interested in maximizing information theoretic quantities of the marginals under local differential privacy. We generalize the results of [10] , and provide stronger results in the sense that we (a) consider a broader class of information theoretic utilities; (b) provide explicit constructions of the optimal mechanisms; and (c) recover the existing result of [10, Theorem 1] (with a stronger condition on ε).
While near-optimal mechanism design has been a popular topic in differential privacy, such a strong optimality result is only known for a few cases. The typical recipe is to propose a differentially private mechanism inspired by [11, 13, 24, 20] , and then to establish near-optimality by comparing the achievable utility to a converse, for example in principal component analysis [8, 5, 19, 22] , linear queries [21, 18] , logistic regression [7] and histogram release [23] . In this paper, we take a different route to solving the utility maximization problem exactly.
Optimal differentially private mechanisms are known only in a few cases. Ghosh et. al. show that the geometric noise adding mechanism is optimal (under a Bayesian setting) for monotone utility functions under count queries (sensitivity one) [17] . This was generalized by Geng et. al.
(albeit for a worst-case input setting) who propose a family of mechanisms and prove the optimality for monotone utility functions under queries with arbitrary sensitivity [14, 16, 15] . This family of optimal mechanisms is called the staircase mechanism because the conditional probability Q(y|x) either moves up by a factor of e ε or down by a factor of e −ε or stays the same when moving from one x to another x in the neighborhood. Since the optimal mechanisms we develop also have a similar extremal structure, we retain the same nomenclature.
Main results
We first give a formal definition of staircase mechanisms and show that they are the optimal solution to the optimization problems of the form (6) . Using the structure of staircase mechanisms, we propose a combinatorial representation of staircase mechanisms. This allows us to reduce the infinite dimensional nonlinear program of (6) to a linear program with 2 |X | variables. Potentially, for any instance of the problem, one can solve this linear program to get the optimal privatization mechanism, albeit with significant computational challenges since the number of variables scales exponentially in the alphabet size. To address this, we show (in Section 3) that two simple staircase mechanisms mechanisms, which we call the binary mechanism and the randomized response mechanism, are the optimal solutions of the problem in high and low privacy regimes, respectively. We further show how to use our results to prove lower bounds on achievable f -divergences under privacy in Section 3.2.
Optimality of staircase mechanisms
For an input alphabet X with |X | = k, we represent the set of ε-locally differentially private mechanisms that lead to output alphabets Y with |Y| = l by
where Q k×l denotes the set of all k ×l conditional distributions. The set of all ε-locally differentially private mechanisms is given by
The set of all conditional distributions acting on X is given by Q = ∪ l∈N Q k,l . We consider two types of utility functions, one for the hypothesis testing setup and another for the statistical estimation setup. In the hypothesis testing setup, the utility is a function of the privatization mechanism and two priors defined on the input alphabet. Namely, U (P 0 , P 1 , Q) : S |X | × S |X | × Q → R + , where P 0 and P 1 are positive priors defined on X and S |X | is the |X | − 1 dimensional probability simplex. P ν is said to be positive if P ν (x) > 0 for all x ∈ X . In the statistical estimation setup, the utility is a function of the privatization mechanism and a prior defined on the input alphabet. Namely, U (P, Q) : S |X | ×Q → R + , where P is a positive prior defined on X . For notational convenience, we will use U (Q) to refer to both U (P, Q) and U (P 0 , P 1 , Q).
Definition 2.1 (Sublinear Functions).
A function µ (z) : R k → R is said to be sublinear if the following two conditions are met
Let Q y be the column of Q corresponding to Q(y|·) and µ be any sublinear function. We study the fundamental tradeoff between privacy and utility by solving the following constrained maximization problem maximize
This includes maximization over a broad range of information theoretic quantities of interest in statistical estimation and hypothesis testing such as total variation, KL-divergence, and χ 2 -divergence, and mutual information [26] . Notice that sublinearity implies convexity. In general this is a complicated nonlinear program, since we are maximizing a convex function in Q and further the dimension of Q might be unbounded; we are seeking an optimal mechanism with no restriction on the output alphabet size |Y|. Our first result proves that one never needs an output alphabet larger than the input alphabet in order to achieve the maximum utility. Further, our result provides a combinatorial representation for the optimal solution.
Theorem 2.2. For any sublinear function µ and any ε ≥ 0, there exists an optimal mechanism Q * maximizing the utility in (6) over all ε-locally differentially private mechanisms, such that
for all y ∈ Y, x, x ∈ X and the output alphabet size is at most the input alphabet size: |Y| ≤ |X |.
In the course of proving the above theorem, we establish that for any general utility U (Q) that is convex in Q (not necessarily decomposing into a sum of sublinear functions as in (6)), there exists an optimal solution requiring the size of the output alphabet to be no more than the size input alphabet: |Y| ≤ |X |.
The optimal solution in Theorem 2.2 is an extremal mechanism, since the absolute value of the log-likelihood ratios can only take one of the two extremal values (see Figure 1 ). For this reason, we refer to such a mechanism as a staircase mechanism, and define the family of staircase mechanisms as
This family includes all optimal mechanisms, and since (7) implies (5), staircase mechanisms are locally differentially private with the same ε. In other words, S ε ⊂ D ε .
For global differential privacy, we can generalize the definition of staircase mechanisms to hold for all neighboring x, x (or equivalently within the sensitivity), and recover all known existing optimal mechanisms. Precisely, the geometric mechanism shown to be optimal in [17] , and the mechanisms shown to be optimal in [14, 16] (also called staircase mechanisms) are special cases of the staircase mechanism formally defined above. We believe that the characterization of these extremal mechanisms and the analysis techniques developed in this paper can be of independent interest to researchers interested in optimal mechanisms for global privacy and more general utilities.
Combinatorial representation of the staircase mechanisms
Now that we know staircase mechanisms are optimal, we can try to combinatorially search for the best staircase for an instance of the function µ and ε. To this end, we give a simple representation of all staircase mechanisms, exploiting the fact that they are scaled copies of a finite number of patterns.
Let Q ∈ R |X |×|Y| be a staircase mechanism, and k = |X | denote the input alphabet size. Then, from the definition of staircase mechanisms, Q(y|x)/Q(y|x ) ∈ {e −ε , 1, e ε } and each column Q(y|·) must be proportional to one of the canonical staircase patterns we define next. 
When k = 3, there are 2 k = 8 staircase patterns and the staircase pattern matrix is given by
e ε e ε e ε e ε 1 1 e ε e ε 1 1 e ε e ε 1 e ε 1 e ε 1 e ε 1 e ε   .
For all values of k, there are exactly 2 k such patterns, and any column Q(y|·) of Q, a staircase mechanism, is a scaled version of one of the columns of S (k) . Using this pattern matrix, we will show that we can represent (an equivalence class of) any staircase mechanism Q as
where Θ = diag(θ) is a 2 k × 2 k diagonal matrix and θ is a 2 k -dimensional vector representing the scaling of the columns of S (k) . We can now formulate the problem of maximizing the utility as the linear program of (9), and prove that this is equivalent to solving the original nonlinear program.
Theorem 2.4. For any sublinear function µ and any ε ≥ 0, the nonlinear program of (6) and the following linear program have the same optimal value
and the optimal solutions are related by (8) .
The infinite dimensional nonlinear program of (12) is now reduced to a finite dimensional linear program. The first constraint ensures that we get a valid probability matrix Q = S (k) Θ with rows that sum to one. One could potentially solve this LP with 2 k variables, but the computational complexity scales exponentially in the alphabet size k = |X |. For practical values of k this might not always be possible. However, in the following sections, we prove that in the high privacy regime (ε ≤ ε * for some positive ε * ), there is a single optimal mechanism, we call the binary mechanism, which dominates over all other mechanisms in a very strong sense for all utility functions of practical interest.
In order to understand the above theorem, notice that the objective function as well as the differential privacy constraints are invariant under permutation (or renaming) of the output of the privatization mechanism. Similarly, the objective function as well as the differential privacy constraints are invariant under merging/splitting of the output that have the same pattern. For an ε-differentially private mechanism Q, suppose there exists two outputs y and y that have the same pattern, i.e., Q(y|·) = C Q(y |·) for some positive constant C. Then, we can consider a new mechanism Q by merging the two columns corresponding to y and y . Let y denote this new merged output. It follows that Q satisfies the differential privacy condition, and resulting utility is also preserved. Precisely, by the fact that Q(y|·) = C Q(y |·), it follows that
by the homogeneity of µ. We can naturally define equivalence classes for staircase mechanisms up to permutation of the columns and merging and splitting of the columns with the same pattern:
[Q] = {Q ∈ S ε | exists a sequence of permutations and merge/split of columns from Q to Q} . (10) To represent an equivalence class, we use a mechanism in [Q] that is ordered and merged to match the patterns of the pattern matrix S (k) . For any staircase mechanism Q, there exists another staircase mechanism Q ∈ [Q] such that Q = S (k) Θ for some diagonal matrix Θ. For the purpose of the optimization problem of the form (6), we can restrict our attention to such representatives of the equivalent classes. Further, the utility of these mechanisms has the form j µ(S (k) j )θ j , a simple linear function of Θ.
Hypothesis testing
In this section, we study the fundamental tradeoff between local privacy and hypothesis testing. Under the data collection scenario, there are n individuals each with data X i from a distribution P ν for a fixed ν ∈ {0, 1}. Let Q denote a non-interactive privatization mechanism guaranteeing ε-local differential privacy. The output of the privatization mechanism Y i 's are independently distributed according to the induced marginals M 0 and M 1 defined in (3). With a slight abuse of notation, we will use M ν and P ν to represent both probability distributions and probability mass functions. The power to discriminate data from P 0 to the data from P 1 depends on the 'distance' between the marginals M 0 and M 1 . To measure the ability of such statistical discrimination, our choice of utility of a privatization mechanism Q is an information theoretic quantity called Csiszár's f -divergence defined as
for some convex function f such that
is a special case of f -divergence with f (x) = x log x, and total variation M 0 − M 1 TV is a special case with f (x) = (1/2)|x − 1|. Note that the f -divergence is not a distance since it might not be symmetric or satisfy triangular inequality. We are interested in characterizing the optimal solution to
where D ε is the set of all ε-locally differentially private mechanisms defined in (5) . A motivating example for this choice of utility is hypothesis testing. Given Y i 's, the data analyst wants to test whether they are generated from M 0 or M 1 . Let the null hypothesis be H 0 : Y i 's are generated from M 0 , and the alternative hypothesis H 1 : Y i 's are generated from M 1 . For a choice of rejection region R ⊆ Y n , the probability of false alarm (type I error) is α = M n 0 (R) and the probability of missed detection (type II error) is β = M n 1 (Y n \R). Let β δ = min R⊆Y n ,α<α * β denote the minimum type II error achievable while keeping type I error rate at most α * . According to Chernoff-Stein lemma, we know that
Suppose the analyst knows P 0 , P 1 , and Q. Then in order to achieve optimal error rate, one would want to maximize the KL-divergence of the induced marginals, over all ε-locally differentially private mechanisms Q. Our main results provide an explicit construction of the optimal mechanism in high and low privacy regimes. Further, it can be used to provides a fundamental limit on the achievable error rates under differential privacy. Precisely, with data collected from an ε-local differential private mechanism, we will show that one cannot achieve type II error smaller than
asymptotically and in the high privacy regime where ε ≤ ε * for some ε * , where the second inequality follows from Pinsker's inequality:
Since (e ε − 1) 2 = O(ε 2 ) for small ε, effective sample size is now reduced from n to ε 2 n. This is the price of privacy, in the high privacy regime.
Optimal staircase mechanisms
From the definition of D f (M 0 ||M 1 ), we have that
Moreover, since the function φ(z, t) = tf z t is convex in (z, t) for 0 ≤ z, t ≤ 1, then µ is convex in Q y . Convexity and homogeniety together imply sublinearlity. Therefore, Theorems 2.2 and 2.4 apply to D f (M 0 ||M 1 ) and we have that staircases are optimal.
For a given P 0 and P 1 , the binary mechanism is defined as a staircase mechanism with only two outputs y ∈ {0, 1} satisfying (see Figure 1 )
Although this mechanism is extremely simple, perhaps surprisingly, we will establish that this is the optimal mechanism when high level of privacy is required. Intuitively, the output is very noisy in the high privacy regime, and we are better off sending just one bit of information that tells you whether your data is more likely to have come from P 0 or P 1 .
Theorem 3.1. For any pair of distributions P 0 and P 1 , there exists a positive ε * that depends on P 0 and P 1 such that for any f -divergences and any positive ε ≤ ε * , the binary mechanism maximizes the f -divergence between the induced marginals over all ε-locally differentially private mechanisms.
This implies that in the high privacy regime, which is a typical setting studied in much of differential privacy literature, the binary mechanism is a universally optimal solution for all fdivergences in (12) . In particular this threshold ε * is universal, in that it does not depend on the particular choice of which f -divergence we are maximizing. This is established by proving a very strong statistical dominance using Blackwell's celebrated result on comparisons of statistical experiments [4] . In a nutshell, we prove that any ε-differentially private mechanism for sufficiently small ε, and can be simulated from the output of the binary mechanism. Hence, the binary mechanism dominates over all other mechanisms and at the same time achieves the maximum divergence. A similar idea has been used previously in [25] to exactly characterize how much privacy degrades under composition.
The optimality of binary mechanisms is not just for high privacy regimes. The next theorem shows that it is the optimal solution of (12) for all ε, when the objective function is the total variation
Theorem 3.2. For any pair of distributions P 0 and P 1 , and any ε ≥ 0, the binary mechanism maximizes total variation of the induced marginals M 0 and M 1 among all ε-locally differentially private mechanisms.
When maximizing the KL-divergence between the induced marginals, we show that the binary mechanism still achieves good performance for ε ≤ C where C now does not depend on P 0 and P 1 . For a special case of KL-divergence, let OPT denote the maximum value of (12) and BIN denote the KL-divergence when the binary mechanism is used. The next theorem shows that BIN ≥ 1 2(e ε + 1) 2 OPT . Theorem 3.3. For any ε and for any pair of distributions P 0 and P 1 , the binary mechanism is an 1/(2(e ε + 1) 2 ) approximation of the maximum KL-divergence of the induced marginals M 0 and M 1 among all ε-locally differentially private mechanisms.
Note that 2(e ε + 1) 2 ≤ 32 for ε ≤ 1, and for any ε ≤ 1 which is the typical regime of interest in differential privacy, we can always use the simple binary mechanism and the resulting divergence is at most a constant factor away from the optimal.
The randomized response mechanism is defined as a staircase mechanism with the same set of outputs as the input, Y = X , satisfying (see Figure 1 )
It is a randomization over the same alphabet, and we are more likely to give an honest response. We view it as a multiple choice generalization of the randomized response method proposed by Warner [27] , assuming equal level of sensitivity for all choices. We establish that this is the optimal mechanism when low level of privacy is required. Intuitively, the noise is small in the low privacy regime, and we want to send as much information about our current data as allowed, but no more. For a special case of maximizing KL-divergence, we show that the randomized response mechanism is the optimal solution of (12) in the low privacy regime (ε ≥ ε * ).
Theorem 3.4. There exists a positive ε * that depends on P 0 and P 1 such that for any P 0 and P 1 , and all ε ≥ ε * , the randomized response mechanism maximizes the KL-divergence between the induced marginals over all ε-locally differentially private mechanisms.
Lower bounds
In this section, we provide converse results on the fundamental limit of differentially private mechanisms; these results follow from our main theorems and are of independent interest in other applications where lower bounds in statistical analysis are studied [3, 21, 6, 9] . For example, a bound similar to (15) was used to provide converse results on the sample complexity for statistical estimation with differentially private data in [10] .
Corollary 3.5. For any ε ≥ 0, let Q be any conditional distribution that guarantees ε-local differential privacy. Then, for any pair of distributions P 0 and P 1 and any positive δ > 0, there exists a positive ε * that depends on P 0 and P 1 and δ such that for any ε ≤ ε * the induced marginals M 0 and M 1 satisfy the bound
This follows from Theorem 3.1 and observing that the binary mechanism achieves
where T ⊆ X is the set of x such that P 0 (x) ≥ P 1 (x). Compared to [10, Theorem 1], we recover their bound of 4(e ε − 1) 2 P 0 − P 1 2 TV with a smaller constant. We want to note that Duchi et al.'s bound holds for all values of ε and uses a different technique of bounding the KL-divergence directly. However no achievable mechanism is provided. We instead provide an explicit mechanism, that is optimal in high privacy regime.
Similarly, in the high privacy regime, we can show the following converse result.
Corollary 3.6. For any ε ≥ 0, let Q be any conditional distribution that guarantees ε-local differential privacy. Then, for any pair of distributions P 0 and P 1 and any positive δ > 0, there exists a positive ε * that depends on P 0 and P 1 and δ such that for any ε ≥ ε * the induced marginals M 0 and M 1 satisfy the bound
where G(P 0 , P 1 ) = X (1 − P 0 (x)) log(P 1 (x)/P 0 (x)).
This follows directly from Theorem 3.4 and observing that the randomized response mechanism achieves D kl (M 0 ||M 1 ) = D kl (P 0 ||P 1 ) − G(P 0 , P 1 )e −ε + O(e −2ε ) .
Similarly for total variation, we can get the following converse result. This follows from Theorem 3.2 and explicitly computing the total variation achieved by the binary mechanism.
Corollary 3.7. For any ε ≥ 0, let Q be any conditional distribution that guarantees ε-local differential privacy. Then, for any pair of distributions P 0 and P 1 , the induced marginals M 0 and M 1 satisfy the bound M 0 − M 1 TV ≤ ((e ε − 1)/(e ε + 1)) P 0 − P 1 TV , and equality is achieved by the binary mechanism.
Proof of Theorems 2.2 and 2.4
We start the proof with a few definitions, a lemma, and a general result that applies to any convex utility function that obeys a mild assumption.
Recall that for an input alphabet X with |X | = k, we represent the set of ε-locally differentially private mechanisms that lead to output alphabets Y with |Y| = l by D ε,l . The set of all ε-locally differentially private mechanisms is given by (2) for any λ ∈ (0, 1). Convex utility functions are ubiquitous in information theory and statistics. Assumption 1. If a k × l privatization mechanism Q (1) ∈ D ε,l is obtained by deleting an all-zero column of a k × l + 1 privatization mechanism Q (2) ∈ D ε,l+1 , then U Q (1) = U Q (2) . Naturally, one would expect that if we delete the zero columns of a privatization mechanism Q (2) to obtain a new privatization mechanism Q (1) , we would still get the same utility. This is because a "reasonable" utility function should not depend on output alphabets with zero probability. 
This theorem implies that among all ε-locally differentially private mechanisms, we only need to consider those that lead to output alphabets of size l ≤ k. In other words, enlarging the input alphabet cannot further maximize the utility. The proof of Theorem 4.1 is given in Section 4.1.
Lemma 4.2.
A k × l conditional distribution Q is ε-locally differentially private if and only if it can be written as Q = SΘ, where S is a k × l matrix with S ij ∈ [1, e ε ] and Θ = diag (θ 1 , . . . , θ l ) with its diagonal entries in R + .
The proof of Lemma 4.2 is provided in Section 4.2. With the above results, we are now ready to prove Theorems 2.2 and 2.4. By Lemma 4.2, for any Q ∈ D ε,l we have that
, where µ is a sublinear function. Since µ is sublinear, it is convex and
for any λ ∈ (0, 1). Furthermore, U (Q) satisfies Assumption 1 because µ (Q j ) = 0 whenever θ j = 0.
U (Q) and note that by Theorem 4.1, U (Q * ) = max Q∈Dε U (Q). Suppose that Q * is of dimensions k × l, where l ≤ k. Each of the l columns of Q * can be expressed as a convex combination of the columns of S (k) , the staircase pattern matrix. This is because the 2 k columns of S (k) are the corner points of the cube [1, e ε ] k and each S * j ∈ [1, e ε ] k . Therefore,
i , where λ ij ≥ 0 for all i and j, and
by the convexity of µ (z) and the non-negativity of θ * j 's. Moreover, observe that since S (k)θ = 1,θ is a valid choice for the linear program of (9) . This implies that max
On the other hand, for anyQ = S (k)Θ , whereθ is valid for the linear program of (9), we have thatQ ∈ D ε,2 k ⊂ D ε and therefore, max S (k) θ=1,θ≥0
The polytope given by S (k) θ = 1 and θ ≥ 0 is a closed and bounded one. Thus, the linear program of (9) is bounded and has a solution, say θ * , at one of the corner points of the polytope. Since there are k equality constraints given by S (k) θ = 1 and 2 k inequality constraints given by θ ≥ 0, any corner point, including θ * , cannot have more than k non-zero entries. FormS by deleting the columns of S (k) corresponding to zero entries of θ * . Similarly, formθ by deleting the zero entries of θ * and letQ =SΘ, whereΘ = diagθ. It is easy to verify that U (Q) = U (Q * ) = µ T θ * ; hence,Q solves linear program of (9) . Moreover,Q has at most k columns andS ij = {1, e ε }. Therefore,Q is a staircase mechanism of dimension k × l, where l ≤ k.
Proof of Theorem 4.1
We start the proof of Theorem 4.1 with an important lemma the proof of which is presented in Section 4.3.
Lemma 4.3. The set of all k × l, ε-locally differentially private mechanisms D ε,l forms a closed and bounded polytope in R kl + . Moreover, let Q be a corner point of the polytope formed by D ε,l , then Q has at most k non-zero columns.
Fix an l > k. Since U (Q) is convex in Q, it suffices to consider the corner points of D ε,l when maximizing U (Q) subject to Q ∈ D ε,l . By Lemma 4.3, any Q (1) , a k × l corner point of D ε,l , has at most k non-zero columns. Therefore, the privatization mechanism Q (2) , obtained by deleting the all-zero columns of Q (1) , has at most k columns. Notice that Q (1) ∈ ∪ k i=1 D ε,i . Since U (Q) satisfies Assumption 1, we have that U Q (1) = U Q (2) and therefore, it suffices to consider
when maximizing U (Q) subject to Q ∈ D ε,l . Thus,
which finishes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 4.2
Claim 4.4. Let Q ∈ D ε,l . If Q ij = 0 for some j ∈ {1, ..., l} then Q ij = 0 for all i ∈ {1, ..., k}.
Proof. Assume that Q i 1 j = 0 and Q i 2 j = 0 for some i 1 , i 2 ∈ {1, ..., k}. It is obvious that q (y j |x i 2 ) ≤ q (y j |x i 1 ) e ε is not satisfied. Therefore, Q is not a locally differentially private mechanism.
It is easy to check that any k × l stochastic matrix Q = SΘ, where Θ is a diagonal matrix with non-negative entries and S is a k × l matrix with S ij ∈ [1, e ε ], satisfies the local differential privacy constraints. Thus, Q ∈ D ε,l . On the other hand, assume that Q ∈ D ε,l . If Q ij = 0 for some j then by Claim 4.4 we have that Q ij = 0 for all i and therefore, we can set θ j = 0 and S ij = 1 for all i. If Q ij > 0 then by Claim 4.4 we have that Q ij > 0 for all i. In this case, let θ j = min i Q ij and observe that θ j > 0 since Q ij > 0 for all i. Let S ij = Q ij /θ i , then it is clear (from the definition of θ i ) that S ij ≥ 1. On the other hand, from the differential privacy constraints, we have that Q ij ≤ Q kj e ε for all k and thus, Q ij ≤ min k Q kj e ε which proves that S ij = Q ij / min k Q kj ≤ e ε . This establishes that any Q ∈ D ε,l can be written as Q = SΘ, where Θ is a diagonal matrix with non-negative entries and S is a k × l matrix with S ij ∈ [1, e ε ].
Proof of Lemma 4.3
We start by showing that D ε,l forms a closed and bounded polytope in R kl + . We are interested in studying the corner points of the polytope formed by D ε,l because convex utility functions are maximized at one of these corner points whenever the space of privatization mechanisms is restricted to D ε,l . Claim 4.5. A privatization mechanism Q ∈ D ε,l if and only if for all x, x ∈ X and all y ∈ Y we have that Q (y|x) ≤ Q (y|x ) e ε .
Proof. By definition, Q is differentially private if for all x, x ∈ X and all B ⊆ Y we have that Q (B|x) ≤ Q (B|x ) e ε . By choosing B = {y} for some y ∈ Y the first direction of the above lemma is proven. In order to prove the other direction, assume that for all x, x ∈ X and all y ∈ Y we have that Q (y|x) ≤ Q (y|x ) e ε . Then for any B ⊆ Y, the following holds
Let Q ∈ D ε,l , then by Claim 4.5, it is easy to see that Q must satisfy lk(k − 1) inequalities of the form Q (y|x) ≤ Q (y|x ) e ε . These inequalities can be compactly represented bỹ
where q = [Q (y 1 |x 1 ) , ..., Q (y 1 |x k ) , ...., Q (y l |x 1 ) , ..., Q (y l |x k )] T andÃ is a lk(k − 1) × kl matrix that contains all the local differential privacy linear constraints. Observe that there is a one-to-one mapping between Q and q. Here is an example for the case when k = l = 2
Moreover, since Q is a row stochastic matrix (a conditional distribution) it satisfies Q1 = 1, where 1 represents the all ones vector of appropriate dimensions. This condition can be rewritten as
where B is a k × kl binary matrix. For the case when k = l = 2, we have that
Finally, observe that Q (y|x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y. These constraints can be incorporated as follows. Let A = Ã T , −I lk T , where I lk is the lk × lk identity matrix, then Aq ≤ 0. To summarize, Q ∈ D ε,l if and only if
Therefore, the set of all k×l, ε-locally differentially private mechanisms D ε,l forms a convex polytope in R kl + .
We now proceed to proving that if Q is a corner point of the polytope formed by D ε,l , then Q has at most k non-zero columns. This claim is obvious for all k × l privatization mechanisms with l ≤ k. Therefore, we restrict our attention to the case where l > k. Let A j be the matrix including all the inequality constraints imposed on the j th column of Q. Observe that the rows of A j form a subset of the rows of A, defined in (26) , and recall that there are k(k − 1) differential privacy and k non-negativity inequality constraints imposed on the j th column of Q. Therefore, A j is a k 2 × k matrix and we have that A j Q j ≤ 0, where Q j represents the j th column of Q. By Claim 4.4, we know that Q j is either equal to zero or contains non-zero entries.
Claim 4.6. In what follows, the term linearly independent inequality constraints refers to linear independent rows of A j .
• If Q j = 0, then k linearly independent inequality constraints are achieved with equality.
• If Q j = 0, then at most k − 1 linearly independent inequality constraints can be achieved with equality.
Proof. In fact, the number of linearly independent inequality constraints (achieved or not) cannot exceed k because A j has a rank less than or equal to k. If Q j = 0, then the k non-negativity inequality constraints are achieved with equality and it is easy to see that they are all linearly independent (in fact, they form an orthonormal basis to R k ). This proves the first part of the claim. We now establish the second part of the claim by showing that if Q j = 0, we cannot have k linearly independent inequality constraints achieved with equality. Assume that Q j = 0 and let A j be the matrix including the largest collection of linearly independent rows of A j corresponding to the inequality constraints that are achieved with equality. In other words,Ã j Q j = 0. IfÃ j contains k rows, then its rank is equal to k. However, this implies that Q j = 0, a contradiction. Therefore, at most k − 1 linearly independent inequality constraints can be achieved with equality when Q j = 0.
Suppose that Q is a corner point of D ε,l and out of its l columns, l >0 are non-zero and l =0 (l =0 = l − l >0 ) are zero. Moreover, assume that the number of non-zero columns of Q is larger than k (i.e., l >0 > k). In this case, from Claim 4.6, we can see that Q achieves at most l >0 (k−1)+(l−l >0 )k linearly independent inequality constraints with equality. Furthermore, at most k additional linearly independent equality constraints (linearly independent rows of the matrix B defined in (26)) can be met by Q. Therefore, the total number of linearly independent constraints that Q achieves with equality is at most l >0 (k − 1) + (l − l >0 )k + k = −l >0 + (l + 1)k < lk, where the last strict inequality follows from the fact that l >0 > k. This implies that Q cannot be a corner point of D ε,l . Therefore, any corner point of D ε,l must have at most k non-zero columns.
Proofs for hypothesis testing

Proof of Theorem 3.1
Let T = {x : P 0 (x) ≥ P 1 (x)}. In other words, P 0 (T ) − P 1 (T ) = max A⊆X P 0 (A) − P 1 (A). Recall that for a given P 0 and P 1 , the binary mechanism is defined as a staircase mechanism with only two outputs y ∈ {0, 1} satisfying
Lemma 5.1. For any pair of distributions P 0 and P 1 , there exists a positive ε * that depends on P 0 and P 1 such that for all y ∈ Y, all l ∈ N, and all Q ∈ D ε,l with ε ≤ ε * , we have that
Moreover, the above upper and lower bounds are achieved by the binary mechanism given in (27) .
Observe that because P 0 (T ) ≥ P 1 (T ) and P 0 (T c ) ≤ P 1 (T c ), the direction of the above inequalities makes sense.
LetM ν be the induced marginal for the binary mechanism when P ν is the original distribution. Following the analysis techniques developed in [25] , we define hypothesis testing region R(M 0 ,M 1 ) as the convex hull of all achievable probabilities of missed detection and false alarm, when testing whether ν = 0 or ν = 1 based on Y bin distributed asM ν :
where S ∈ Y is the accept region for hypothesis ν = 0. For the binary mechanism, this ends up being a very simple triangular region. The slopes defining the two sides of the triangular region are:
Figure 2: Hypothesis testing regions for two mechanisms.
For any other mechanism satisfying the ε-local differential privacy for ε ≤ ε * , the above lemma implies that for any choice of the rejection region S, the slopes satisfy
In the hypothesis testing region, this implies that
as in the following Figure 2 .
From Theorem 2.5 of [25] , we know that this implies a certain Markov property. Precisely, let Y bin denote the output of the binary mechanism, and Y dp denote the output of any ε-local differentially private mechanism. Then, it follows that there exists a coupling of Y bin and Y dp such that they form a Markov chain: ν-Y bin -Y dp , where ν is the hypothesis on P ν whether the data was generated from ν = 0 or ν = 1. Then, it follows from the data processing inequality of f -divergences that
It follows that there is no algorithm with larger f -divergence than the binary mechanism.
Proof of Lemma 5.1
We start by showing that the binary mechanism achieves the upper and lower bounds presented in the statement of the lemma. Let M B 0 and M B 1 denote the induced marginals under the binary mechanism given in (27) . For ν ∈ {0, 1}, we have that
Computing
(1) we see that the binary mechanism achieves the upper and lower bounds for all values of ε.
As in Lemma 4.2, for any l ∈ N, Q ∈ D ε,l can be represented as Q = SΘ, where S ∈ [1, e ε ] k×l and Θ = diag (θ 1 , ..., θ l ) with its diagonal entries in R + . We now show that for any l ∈ N and any Q ∈ D ε,l , the following upper bound holds
for all y ∈ Y and sufficiently small ε. The above expression can be alternatively written as
where S j ∈ [1, e ε ] k . Equation (31) is linear in S j and is therefore minimized (and maximized) at the corner points of [1, e ε ] k×l , a cube in R k×l + . The corner points of this cube are given by the staircase patterns: S j ∈ {1, e ε } k . To begin with, let S j be a staircase pattern with T j = {x i : S ij = e ε } = T . Then Equation (31) is equivalent to
Using the fact that P 0 (T ) − P 1 (T ) > P 0 (T j ) − P 1 (T j ) for all T j = T , the inequality in (31) holds true for all ε whenever P 0 (T )
, then the inequality in (31) holds true for all ε ≤ ε(j), where
On the other hand, it is easy to verify that when T j = T , we have that
for all ε. In this case, set ε(j) = 0 and ε 1 = min j∈[2 k ] ε(j). Therefore, for any l ∈ N and any Q ∈ D ε,l , the upper bound in the statement of the lemma holds for all ε ≤ ε 1 .
Note that any satisfiable solution α * to (41) provides an upper bound to (40) since max
Consider the following choice of dual variable
for i ∈ [k]. Observe that
We claim that α * is a feasible dual variable for all values of ε. In order to prove that α * is a feasible dual variable, we show that
Notice that we have arranged the equation such that all the summands are non-negative. Without loss of generality, we will assume that
) and the differential privacy condition that S (k) ij ∈ {1, e ε } for all i and j, it follows that e −ε
This is immediate, since the right-hand side is minimized when S (k) ij 's for x i ∈ T c are ones and the left-hand side is maximized when S (k) ij 's for x i ∈ T are e ε . Now, (44) can be written as
where the last inequality follows from (45).
This establishes the satisfiability of α * for all ε which, in turn, shows that (43) is indeed an upper bound to the primal problem. It remains to show that this upper bound can be achieved via the binary mechanism. To this extent, recall that for a given P 0 and P 1 , the binary mechanism is defined as a staircase mechanism with only two outputs y ∈ {0, 1} satisfying Q(0|x) = e ε 1+e ε if P 0 (x) ≥ P 1 (x) , 1 1+e ε if P 0 (x) < P 1 (x) .
Q(1|x) = e ε 1+e ε if P 0 (x) < P 1 (x) ,
Computing the TV distance between M 0 and M 1 under (46), we get that
Hence, the binary mechanism in (46) achieves the upper bound in (43). This proves the optimality of the binary mechanism for all ε.
we have that 1 T α * = 1 (e ε − 1) (e ε + k − 1) (P 0 (x i ) (e ε − 1) + 1) log (P 0 (x i ) (e ε − 1) + 1) (P 1 (x i ) (e ε − 1) + 1) .
We claim that α * is a feasible dual variable for sufficiently large ε. In order to prove that α * is a feasible dual variable, we show that S (k) T j α * − µ j ≥ 0 for all j ∈ [2 k ] for all ε ≥ ε * , where ε * is a positive quantity that depends on the priors P 0 and P 1 . Using the facts that log (a + e ε b) = ε + log b + O e
for large ε, we get that µ j = (P 0 (T j ) (e ε − 1) + 1) log (P 0 (T j ) (e ε − 1) + 1) (P 1 (T j ) (e ε − 1) + 1) = P 0 (T j ) log P 0 (T j ) P 1 (T j ) e ε + (1 − P 0 (T j )) log P 0 (T j )
On the other hand,
Assume, to begin with, that j = {j 1 , j 2 , ..., j k }. Then
Notice that for j = {j 1 , j 2 , ..., j k }, P 0 (T j ) log P 0 (T j ) P 1 (T j ) > x i ∈T j P 0 (x i ) log P 0 (x i ) P 1 (x i ) by the log-sum inequality. Therefore, there exists a ε(j) > 0 such that S (k) T j α * − µ j ≥ 0 for all ε ≥ ε(j). If j ∈ {j 1 , j 2 , ..., j k }, it is not hard to check that S (k) T j α * − µ j = 0 for all ε. In this case, set ε(j) = 0. This establishes the satisfiability of α * for all ε ≥ ε * = max j∈[2 k ] ε(j). The satisfiability of α * , in turn, shows that (52) is indeed an upper bound to the primal problem. It remains to show that this upper bound can be achieved via the randomized response. To this extent, recall that the randomized response is given by Q(y|x) = 
Computing the KL divergence between M 0 and M 1 under (57), we get that
i∈ [k] (P 0 (x i ) (e ε − 1) + 1) log (P 0 (x i ) (e ε − 1) + 1) (P 1 (x i ) (e ε − 1) + 1) .
Hence, the randomized response in (57) achieves the upper bound in (52). This proves the optimality of the randomized response for all ε ≥ ε * .
Proof of Theorem 3.3
We start the proof with a fundamental bound on the symmetrized KL divergence between the M 0 and M 1 .
Lemma 5.2. For any ε ≥ 0, let Q be any conditional distribution that guarantees ε differential privacy. Then for any pair of distributions P 0 and P 1 , the induced marginals M 0 and M 1 must satisfy the bound
The above lemma appears as Theorem 1 in [10] . By Lemma 5.2, we have that
Let M B 0 and M B 1 be the marginals obtained by using the binary mechanism given in (13) . By = 2 e ε − 1 e ε + 1
Combining (60) and (61) we get that BIN ≥ 1 2(e ε +1) 2 OPT which was to be shown.
